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COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS: LET THE SIGNERS
BEWARE
I. APPLICABLE LAW
[Tihe remedy by arbitration, whatever its merits or short-
comings, substantially affects the cause of action created by
the State. .... The change from a court of law to an arbitra-
tion panel may make a radical difference in ultimate result.
Arbitration carries no right to trial by jury. . . . Arbitrators
do not have the benefit of judicial instruction on the law; they
need not give their reasons for their results; the record of their
proceedings is not as complete as it- is in a court trial; and
judicial review of an award is more limited than judicial re-
view of a trial. .... I
Arbitration is a consensual, private and nonjudicial
method of settling disputes which has important ramifications
on the legal rights of the parties involved. Because of the final-
ity usually accorded arbitration proceedings, the agreement to
arbitrate is, essentially, an agreement to waive many of the
protections one would have if litigating in a public forum. Yet,
despite the "informalities and looser approximations as to the
enforcement of their rights,"' arbitration can provide an eco-
nomic and efficient method of dispute resolution which meets
the needs and desires of the parties involved. Thus, long before
courts and legislatures endorsed arbitration as a matter of pub-
lic policy, businessmen were agreeing to arbitrate disputes.
A. Historical Development
Historically, courts were reluctant to enforce arbitration
agreements. At common law, agreements to arbitrate were re-
vocable until the time of the award: "[Elven if a submission
has been made to arbitrators, who are named, by deed or other-
wise, with an express stipulation, that the submission shall be
irrevocable, it is still revocable and countermandable, by either
party, before the award is actually made, although not after-
wards."' 3 By 1915 the various attitudes toward irrevocable
agreements to arbitrate future disputes had crystalized. The
1. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, Inc., 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
2. Hart v. Orion Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 1358, 1361 (10th Cir. 1971).
3. Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 Fed. Cas. 1313, 1321 (D. Mass. 1845).
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most important of these views were summarized that year in
United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petro-
leum Co.4
(1) The agreement to arbitrate is collateral to the main con-
tract; if disregarded the other party could still sue for dam-
ages for breach of the collateral agreement.
(2) Such agreements tend to oust the courts of their juris-
diction and thus violate public policy "in that it is not com-
petent for private persons either to increase or diminish the
statutory juridical power."'5
(3) "Arbitration may be a condition precedent to suit, and
as such valid, if it does not prevent legal action, or seek to
determine out of court the general question of liability. '
The gradual modification of both judicial and legislative
attitudes toward arbitration was spurred by the enactment of
the New York arbitration act of 1920 which permitted irrevoca-
ble agreements to arbitrate future disputes.7 In 1921 Judge Car-
dozo authored an opinion which validated this new arbitration
law. Finding the law applicable to preexisting contracts, he
stated that the statute "declares a new public policy and abro-
gates an ancient rule,"' and he refuted challenges to the valid-
ity of the statute. It did not, he found, deny the right to jury
trial since that right could be waived, as it was by the consent
to arbitrate. Likewise, he saw little substance in the traditional
argument that such agreements oust the courts of their juris-
diction. "Jurisdiction exists that rights may be maintained.
Rights are not maintained that jurisdiction may exist."9
From 1920 to the present, arbitration has gained increasing
favor with both legislatures and courts. Statutes authorizing
agreements to arbitrate future disputes have been adopted by
at least 35 states,10 and the Federal Arbitration Act' expresses
the congressional approval of arbitration in maritime and in-
terstate commerce transactions. The present day Wisconsin
4. 222 F. 1006 (S.D. N.Y. 1915).
5. Id. at 1008.
6. Id.
7. 1920 N.Y. Laws, ch. 275; N.Y. LAB. LAW (Consol.), ch. 72 (1920), as cited in In
re Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 230 N.Y. 261, 130 N.E. 288 (1921).
8. 230 N.Y. at 269, 130 N.E. at 289.
9. Id. at 274, 130 N.E. at 291.
l0. G. GOLDBERG, A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO COMMERcIAL ARBIRATION § 1.02, at 7 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as GOLDBERG].
11. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1970).
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statute, 2 like many state arbitration statutes, is drawn from
the Uniform Arbitration Act, 3 which is based upon the 1920
New York act. The pertinent part of Wisconsin Statutes sec-
tion 298.01, dealing with the submission of contracts to arbitra-
tion, reads:
A provision in any written contract to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract, or out of
the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an
agreement in writing between two or more persons to submit
to arbitration any controversy existing between them at the
time of the agreement to submit, shall be valid, irrevocable
and enforceable save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract; . . .
This provision validates irrevocable agreements to arbitrate
existing and future controversies, except where such arbitra-
tion would be barred by law.'5 The remainder of the Act deals
with various elements of the arbitration procedure and award,
and the situations under which an award may be vacated or
modified by the court.
B. Scope of the Agreement to Arbitrate
Contractual arbitration provisions generally specify the
scope of the submission and outline the procedures to be fol-
lowed. For instance, many trade associations rely on the exper-
tise of special arbitration groups to determine the standard
meaning of contract language and the customary practices in
the trade. 7 Other commercial arbitration agreements may refer
to the rules of the American Arbitration Association or rely on
statutory procedures. Arbitration agreements may involve ei-
ther pre-existing or future disputes. They may be either broad
and general, leaving all disputes arising under or relating to the
contract for arbitration, or narrow, confining arbitration to is-
sues of contract interpretation or measurement of perform-
ance. 18 The standard commercial arbitration clause suggested
by the American Arbitration Association reads:
12. WIs. STAT., ch. 298 (1975).
13. See GOLDBERG, supra note 10, at 137, app. B.
14. WIs. STAT. § 298.01 (1975).
15. GOLDBERG, supra note 10, § 1.04 at 14.
16. WIS. STAT. §§ 298.02-.18 (1975).
17. Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 849 (1961).
18. Id. at 853.
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Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this
contract, or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration
in accordance with the Rules of the American Arbitration
Association, and judgment upon the award rendered by the
Arbitrator(s) may be entered in any Court having jurisdiction
thereof.'9
This language binds the parties, irrevocably, to arbitrate future
disputes arising out of the contract and relating to performance
as well as interpretation of the contract.
When the language of either the state or the federal arbitra-
tion statutes is combined with a broad arbitration clause, such
as that recommended by the American Arbitration Associa-
tion, the submission to arbitration is virtually unlimited and
almost all issues are left for the arbitrator." Such broad arbi-
tration agreements are not always enforceable, however. For
instance, illegal contracts such as those involving usurious
transactions2' are not arbitrable.2 1
As the courts moved away from their initial distrust of arbi-
tration, situations arose where arbitration conflicted with var-
ious other public policies and the courts had to balance their
favor for arbitration and the private interest in freedom of con-
tract against other policy considerations. This balancing was
best expressed in Wilko v. Swan,23 a 1953 United States Su-
preme Court decision holding that a stockholder may not, by
agreeing to arbitrate, waive the protections legislatively pro-
vided by the Securities Act of 1933.
Two policies, not easily reconcilable, are involved in this
case. Congress has afforded participants in transactions sub-
ject to its legislative power an opportunity generally to secure
prompt, economical and adequate solution of controversies
through arbitration if the parties are willing to accept less
certainty of legally correct adjustments. On the other hand,
it has enacted the Securities Act to protect the rights of inves-
tors and has forbidden a waiver of any of those rights. Recog-
nizing the advantages that prior agreements for arbitration
may provide for the solution of commercial controversies, we
19. See Commercial Rules of the American Arbitration Association (1973) in
GOLDBERG, supra note 10, at 128 app. A.
20. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
21. Durst v. Abrash, 22 App. Div. 2d 39, 253 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1964).
22. GOLDBERG, supra note 10, § 1.04 at 14.
23. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
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decide that the intention of Congress concerning the sale of
securities is better carried out by holding invalid such an
agreement for arbitration of issues arising under the Act.24
A similar position has been taken with regard to antitrust
claims.25 The effect of the Wilko decision, however, has recently
been narrowed by a court of appeals holding that the nonwaiver
provisions of the Securities Act do not preclude enforcement of
an arbitration agreement between stock exchange members.28
In reaching this conclusion, the court referred to the increas-
ingly favored position of arbitration as a matter of public pol-
icy.
The extent to which the Court now shields the agreement
to arbitrate from countervailing legal considerations is exem-
plified by the 1967 Prima Paint27 decision. There, the Supreme
Court held that a claim of fraud in the inducement of the
contract is arbitrable "[w]hen no claim is made that fraud
was directed to the arbitration clause itself, a broad arbitration
clause will be held to encompass arbitration of the claim that
the contract itself was induced by fraud. 128 This majority posi-
tion was strongly attacked in the dissent authored by Justice
Black:
The Court holds, what is to me fantastic, that the legal issue
of a contract's voidness because of fraud is to be decided by
persons designated to arbitrate factual controversies arising
out of a valid contract between the parties. And the arbitra-
tors who the Court holds are to adjudicate the legal validity
of the contract need not even be lawyers, and in all probabil-
ity will be nonlawyers, wholly unqualified to decide legal is-
sues, and even if qualified to apply the law, not bound to do
so. I am by no means sure that thus forcing a person to forgo
his opportunity to try his legal issues in the courts where,
unlike the situation in arbitration, he may have a jury trial
and right to appeal, is not a denial of due process of law. 9
The Prima Paint majority decision reflects the magnitude of
the shift from common law attitudes. The case is, however,
24. Id. at 438.
25. See, e.g., Sam Reisfeld & Son Import Co. v. S. A. Eteco, 530 F.2d 679, 691 (5th
Cir. 1976); Power Replacements, Inc. v. Air Preheater Co., 426 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1970).
26. Tullis v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 551 F.2d 632 (5th Cir. 1977).
27. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
28. Id. at 402.
29. Id. at 407.
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consistent with lower court positions regarding the arbitrability
of tort claims related to contracts containing arbitration
clauses. "[T]hat a complaint [sounds] in tort will not in
itself prevent arbitration if the underlying contract embraces
the disputed matter. '3 Using this rationale, cases involving
negligence,3' misrepresentation,3 2 improper business conduct,33
architectural mr'alpractice,34 fraud,35 trademark infringement
and unfair competition 3 have been referred to arbitration. In
line with the favored position accorded arbitration, courts ana-
lyzing the arbitrability of torts have held that "[t]he basic
purpose of the United States Arbitration Act is to relieve the
parties from costly litigation and help ease congested court
dockets, ' '31 and that torts are "arbitrable at least until and
unless it is otherwise decided by the arbitrator. 38 However,
tort claims will not be referred to arbitration where the lan-
guage of the contract specifically excludes them or the referral
is sufficiently narrow for the court to conclude that the parties
did not intend to arbitrate torts.39
The New York State Court of Appeals took an interesting
position in the 1976 case of Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., ° hold-
ing that punitive damages should not be awarded by arbitra-
tors since such damages are a "social exemplary 'remedy' not
[a] private compensatory remedy" and should not be awarded
in private arbitration proceedings.4'
Actual damage is measurable against some objective stan-
dard - the number of pounds, or days, or gallons or yards;
30. Legg Mason & Co. v. Mackall & Coe, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 1367, 1370-71 (D.D.C.
1972) citing Saucy Susan Products, Inc. v. Allied Old English, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 724
(S.D. N.Y. 1951).
31. Acevedo Maldonado v. PPG Indus., Inc. v. Fluor, Inc., 514 F.2d 614 (1st Cir.
1975).
32. Lawson Fabrics, Inc. v. Akzona, Inc., 355 F. Supp. 1146 (S.D. N.Y.) afl'd, 486
F.2d 1394 (2d Cir. 1973).
33. Legg Mason & Co. v. Mackall & Coe, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 1367 (D.C. 1972).
34. In re Paver & Wildfoerster & Catholic High School Assoc., 382 N.Y.S.2d 22,
38 N.Y.2d 669, 345 N.E.2d 565 (1976).
35. Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1972).
36. Saucy Susan Products, Inc. v. Allied Old English, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 724 (S.D.
N.Y. 1951).
37. Legg Mason & Co. v. Mackall & Coe, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 1367, 1372 (D.D.C.
1972).
38. Acevedo Maldonado v. PPG Indus., Inc., 514 F.2d 614 (1st Cir. 1975).
39. Bruno v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 865 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
40. 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1976).
41. Id. at 358, 353 N.E.2d at 795, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
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but punitive damages take their shape from the subjective
criteria involved in attitudes toward correction and reform,
and courts do not accept readily the delegation of that kind
of power. Where punitive damages have been allowed for
those torts which are still regarded somewhat as public penal
wrongs as well as actionable private wrongs, they have had
rather close judicial supervision. If the usual rules [of arbi-
tration] were followed there would be no effective judicial
supervision over punitive awards in arbitration. 2
Although in Garrity the court simply vacated the award of
punitive damages, which was modest, the effect of Garrity's
public policy reasoning on the scope of a submission to arbitra-
tion is not yet apparent. It may be an opening to judicial scru-
tiny and intervention where torts for which punitive damages
are appropriate are involved or, if it stands for the proposition
that although torts relating to a contract are arbitrable, puni-
tive damages may not be awarded, it is a further example of
the rights waived by the agreement to arbitrate.43
Thus, prodded by legislation the courts have swung from
the jealous guarding of judicial prerogatives, reflected in the
common law fear that arbitration agreements would oust the
courts of their jurisdiction, to an unscrutinizing acceptance of
arbitration. When dealing with other legislative enactments,
the courts maintain a semblance of balancing the public policy
favoring arbitration against conflicting policies reflected in
those enactments.4 However, when it comes to affording com-
mon law protections to contracting parties in situations such
as fraud in the inducement of the contract, adhesion contracts
and business torts committed by one of the contracting parties,
the courts are loathe to interfere with the public policy favoring
42. Id. at 359, 353 N.E.2d at 796, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 834, citing In re Publishers'
Ass'n, 280 App. Div. 500, 503, 114 N.Y.S.2d 401, 404 (1952).
43. An interesting juxtaposition of the results of a broadly enforced agreement to
arbitrate can be gleaned from recent N.Y.S. Court of Appeals cases. In Garrity the
court held that punitive damages could not be awarded in arbitration. In another 1976
case, also authored by Chief Justice Breitel, the court found that although the submis-
sion encompassed a tort claim which in a court of law would be barred by the statute
of limitations, the contractual claim was not so barred and that both could be consid-
ered by the arbitrators. Such a position is logical in light of the fact that arbitrators
need not follow rules of substantive law and need not give reasons for their decisions.
Thus, although these decisions limit the kinds of damages permitted in arbitration,
they remove some limitations on the causes of action asserted. See In re Paver &
Wildfoerster & Catholic High School Assoc., 38 N.Y.2d 669, 345 N.E.2d 565 (1976).
44. Lawson Fabrics, Inc. v. Akzona, Inc., 355 F. Supp. 1146, 1149 (S.D. N.Y. 1973).
[Vol. 61:466
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arbitration.4 5 Thus, not only are many arbitration procedures
insulated from judicial review, but the initial agreement to
arbitrate is subject to very little scrutiny both as to its making
and as to the situations which the parties might reasonably
have intended to be covered by the agreement."
C. Effect of the Agreement to Arbitrate
Once the submission to arbitration is made, the arbitration
will proceed according to the rules designated in the contract
or mandated by statute. The standard arbitration clause pro-
vides that arbitration will be held in accordance with the rules
of the American Arbitration Association. Many of the fifty-two
sections of the Commercial Arbitration Rules" deal with proce-
dural matters, such as selection of arbitrators and locale, or
with housekeeping matters, such as fees and expenses. Other
sections are more directly related to the actual proceedings and
the award. Although these rules prescribe standards which at-
tempt to preserve the rights of the parties, an arbitration hear-
ing is far more informal than a court trial and there are fewer
restraints on the decisions of the arbitrator. For purposes of
comparison with court procedures, the Association rules and
court decisions regarding discovery and receipt of evidence are
particularly pertinent. For instance, discovery is limited,48
hearsay evidence may be accepted by the arbitrator,49 and
witnesses need not be under oath."
The amount of pretrial discovery permitted varies among
the jurisdictions." Discovery actually ordered may be subject
to the limitations of both the arbitrator's authorization and the
court's approval.52 Although discovery has been ordered,53
45. See, e.g., Id. Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir.
1972); Federico v. Frick, 3 Cal. App. 3d 872, 84 Cal. Rptr. 74 (1970) (contract of
adhesion arbitrable).
46. Lawson Fabrics, Inc. v. Akzona, Inc., 355 F. Supp. 1146, 1148 (S.D. N.Y. 1973).
47. The Commercial Arbitration Rules are set out in GOLDBERG, supra note 10, at
128 app. A.
48. See Mississippi Power Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 69 F.R.D. 558 (S.D. Miss.
1976). See also GOLDBERG, supra note 10, § 3.03 at 41-42.
49. In re Norma Brill & Muller Bros., Inc., 40 Misc. 2d 683, 243 N.Y.S.2d 905
(1962), afl'd 13 N.Y.2d 776, 192 N.E.2d 34 (1963).
50. See Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association §
26 in GOLDBERG, supra note 10, at 131 app. A.
51. GOLDBERG, supra note 10, § 3.03 at 42.
52. See GOLDBERG, supra note 10, § 3.03 at 42; Wis. STAT. § 298.07 (1975).
53. Bigge Crane & Rigging Co. v. Docutel Corp., 371 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. N.Y. 1973).
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many courts feel that the imposition of a complicated
judicially-supervised discovery process destroys the vaunted
efficiency and economy of the arbitration process, and that
discovery should, therefore, not be ordered."
Arbitrators are their own judges of the relevancy and mate-
riality of the facts, and they are not restricted by substantive
law or rules of evidence. 5 Not only can the most blatant hear-
say be accepted by the arbitrators,56 but because the arbitrators
need not give reasons for their decisions,57 there may often be
no record of how much weight was given to evidence which
would never have been admitted to a court of law.
Because finality of arbitration results is considered desira-
ble, judicial review is extremely limited. The review available
to the signers of an arbitration agreement was discussed in a
1968 New York decision.
A mistake or error of the arbitrator as to the law or facts will
not vitiate an award "unless it results in a failure of intent
or breach of authority or is so gross or palpable as to establish
fraud or misconduct." Nor will the court concern itself with
the form or sufficiency of the evidence before the arbitrators
or some departure from formal technicalities in the absence
of a clear showing that statutory grounds exist for vacator of
the award. ... Moreover, "arbitrators are not hampered in
the discharge of their duty by rules of evidence, or the body
of case and statutory law governing the prosecution of actions
.... " In a valid submission questions of law and fact are
for the arbitrators. "When parties agree to arbitrate, they
agree to waive the rules of evidence and the inexorable appli-
cation of substantive rules as well. ' 58
Yet, despite the broad power of arbitrators to determine the
scope of the arbitration and to make their own determinations
of the law and facts involved, both statutory and case law
provide fairly strict controls upon the conduct of the arbitra-
tors.59 The major problem, of course, with enforcing these con-
54. Mississippi Power Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 69 F.R.D. 558 (S.D. Miss. 1976).
55. Korein v. Rabin, 287 N.Y.S.2d 975, 29 App. Div. 2d 351 (1968).
56. In re Norma Brill & Muller Bros., Inc., 40 Misc. 2d 683, 243 N.Y.S.2d 905
(1962), aff'd 13 N.Y.2d 776, 192 N.E.2d 34 (1963).
57. Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1214-15 (2d Cir. 1972).
58. Korein v. Rabin, 287 N.Y.S.2d 975, 980, 29 App. Div. 2d 351, 356 (1968) (cita-
tions omitted).
59. WIs. STAT. § 298.10 (1975); Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas-
ualty Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968), reh. denied 393 U.S. 1112 (1968).
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trols is that the record of the proceedings need not be complete
and the arbitrators need not set forth the reasons for their
award. 0
The statutory provisions regarding vacation or modification
of awards are found in Wisconsin Statutes sections 298.10 and
298.11. An award must be vacated:
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud
or undue means;
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption on
the part of the arbitrators, or either of them;
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in
refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause
shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material
to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the
rights of any party have been prejudiced;
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite
award upon the subject matter submitted was not made."
Thus, although fraud in the inducement of the contract will not
keep a dispute from arbitration, if fraud is found in the pro-
curement of the award, the award must be vacated. The statu-
tory concern not only with fairness but also with the appear-
ance of fairness was reflected in a 1968 United States Supreme
Court decision, Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental
Casualty Co. 2 This case involved a supposedly neutral arbitra-
tor who had had business contacts with one of the parties to
the arbitration but had not disclosed this to the other party.
Construing a section of the Federal Arbitration Act which par-
allels Wisconsin Statutes section 298.10(1), the Court held that
the award should be set aside because the arbitrator must not
only "be unbiased but also must avoid even the appearance of
bias.""
The Wisconsin Statutes also specify situations in which the
court must either modify or correct an arbitration award:
(a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation
of figures or an evident material mistake in the description
of any person, thing or property referred to in the award;
60. See Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association, §
22; Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211 (2d Cir. 1972).
61. Wis. STAT. § 298.10 (1975).
62. 393 U.S. 145, reh. denied, 393 U.S. 1112 (1968).
63. Id. at 150.
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(b) Where the arbitrators had awarded upon a matter
not submitted to them unless it is a matter not affecting the
merits of the decision upon the matter submitted;
(c) Where the award is imperfect in manner or form not
affecting the merits of the controversy.
(2) The order must modify and correct the award, so as
to affect the intent thereof and promote justice between the
parties. 4
Despite the precautions against arbitrary awards contained in
these statutory provisions, the fact that an arbitrator is not
required to state the reasons for his award will often make it
impossible for the court to determine whether there are
grounds for vacation or modification of the award.
The problem is how a court is to be made aware of the erring
conduct of the arbitrators. . . . [A] rule [that arbitrators
explain their reasoning in every case] would undermine the
very purpose of arbitration, which is to provide a relatively
quick, efficient and informal means of private dispute settle-
ment. The sacrifice that arbitration entails in terms of legal
precision is recognized, and is implicitly accepted in the ini-
tial assumption that certain disputes are arbitrable. Given
that acceptance, primary consideration for the courts must
be that the system operate expeditiously as well as fairly. 5
II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Arbitration often provides a swift and easy means to resolve
disputed issues. When this is true, arbitration saves needless
litigation expenses and court time. There are particular situa-
tions where the technical expertise of an arbitrator may be
more desirable than the legal expertise of a judge. Additionally,
arbitration has the benefit of finality for those parties who want
a quick resolution of disputes without the likelihood of future
court appeals. However, arbitration has several shortcomings.
Since arbitrators are not bound by precedent, the results are
not always predictable. Additionally, because of the limited
scope of review of arbitral decisions concerning the facts and
the law involved in the dispute, a fair hearing is not guaranteed
in all cases.66
64. Wis. STAT. § 298.11 (1975).
65. Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 469 F.2d 1064, 1214 (2nd Cir. 1972).,
66. See C. WEHRINGER, ARBITRATION PRECEPTS AND PRINCIPLES, at 8 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as WEHINGER], citing Horowitz, Guides for Resorting to Commer-
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The hands-off policy of courts reviewing the scope of arbi-
tration clauses and the equities involved in particular cases is
unsettling, since broad arbitration clauses, such as that sug-
gested by the American Arbitration Association, reflect little
recognition by the parties of the kinds of situations covered and
of the rights being waived. Some situations are readily arbitra-
ble. These include those involving simple issues of fact, or a
special relationship between the parties such as might be found
in a close corporation or partnership, or those where an expert
can most appropriately resolve questions concerning the cus-
tomary meaning of contract language or customary practices in
the trade. However, where difficult questions of law or fact are
involved, where the special knowledge of an arbitrator is not
essential or could be provided by an expert witness, where a
jury trial is desired, or where the expenses of the procedure
outweigh its benefits, arbitration loses much of its desirabil-
ity.67
Hypothetical and actual examples may help to illustrate
these points. A contract, between a prime contractor and a
subcontractor contains a clause calling for repair of equipment
by the subcontractor, but replacement by the prime contractor.
A dispute arises as to whether equipment should be repaired
or replaced, and the arbitration clause is invoked. This is an
excellent example of the kind of dispute which should be arbi-
trated since it was probably within the contemplation of the
parties when the arbitration agreement was made. The dispute
relates to a contractual provision, and resolution can appropri-
ately draw upon the expertise of one who understands the
equipment involved and the customary practices in the indus-
try.
The same subcontract provides that the contract will be
void if, due to an Act of God, the prime contract becomes void.
In collusion with others and in an effort to involve a different
subcontractor, the prime contractor induces the agency with
which the prime contract was made to void that contract. The
prime contractor then enters into a new, substantially similar
contract with the agency and retains a different subcontractor.
If tbrtious interference with business relationships is charged,
cial Arbitration, 8 PRACncAL LAWYER 67, 75 (1962).
67. WEHRINGER, supra note 66, at 8-9.
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proof of such a charge may require in depth, court-supervised
discovery. Because of the complex legal and factual issues and
the involvement of noncontracting parties, such a case should
probably not be referred to arbitration.
No deep chasm divides arbitrable from nonarbitrable is-
sues. One cannot readily conclude that contract issues should
be arbitrated and tort issues not. Although the dissent in Prima
Paint"' made some good arguments for the nonarbitrability of
fraud in the inducement of the contract, other courts dealing
with different fact situations but similar legal issues, may pres-
ent more compelling arguments for referring the dispute to
arbitration. For example, in 1972 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals sent the case of Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball
Club 9 to arbitration, holding that the issue of whether Julius
Erving had been defrauded into leaving college and signing a
contract with the Virginia Squires, or whether he was simply
attempting to jump teams for more money, was arbitrable.
Two points must be made about the decision, however. First,
the decision was written by Judge Harold Medina who au-
thored the Robert Lawrence" decision upon which the Prima
Paint majority relied heavily; and second, the court analyzed
the facts and emphasized those which made the fraud charge
seem secondary or even specious.7 Thus, the legal precedent
was laid by an earlier holding of the decision writer; yet despite
this precedent and the court's evident partiality for arbitration,
the court appeared to scrutinize the facts involved before order-
ing arbitration. Although the desirability of such judicial scru-
tiny of the facts and issues of law involved in an arbitration
submission is often disclaimed, it is consistent with the review
of the arbitrator's award which is statutorily prescribed, al-
though often not available in fact.72
The view that arbitration is not favored in cases involving
complex issues or numerous parties was recently voiced by the
Minnesota Supreme Court:
68. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
69. 468 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1972).
70. Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire, 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. granted,
362 U.S. 909 (1960), dismissed under Rule 60, 364 U.S. 801 (1960).
71. 468 F.2d at 1066-67.
72. Wis. STAT. §§ 298.10, 298.11 (1975); but see Aerojet-Gen'l Corp. v. American
Arbitration Ass'n, 478 F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1973); Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d
1211 (2d Cir. 1972).
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COMMENTS
[T]he fact that arbitration is favored by this Court does not
mean that it is our favorite remedy in situations where it
would jeopardize other favored procedures and policies. Of at
least equal stature and importance are our Rules of Civil
Procedure, a major purpose of which is to encourage the effi-
cient and expeditious resolution of controversies by facilitat-
ing joinder of all related parties and claims. . . .Where arbi-
tration would increase rather than decrease delay, complex-
ity and costs, it should not receive favored treatment. 73
Thus, rather than liberally construing broad agreements to
arbitrate future disputes, the courts should carefully scrutinize
them. If contracting parties were required to specify the kinds
of future disputes which they agree to arbitrate, there would be
greater likelihood that they recognized the issues involved and
the rights waived. Additionally, courts should closely scruti-
nize and be reluctant to enforce arbitration agreements where
the dispute involves fraud in the inducement of the contract,
punitive damages, 74 or an element of bad faith.75
CORNELIA GRIFFIN FARMER
73. Prestressed Concrete, Inc. v. Adolfson & Peterson, Inc., 240 N.W.2d 551, 553
(Minn. 1976).
74. As discussed in Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 386 N.Y.S.2d 831, 40 N.Y.2d 354,
353 N.E.2d 793 (1976), punitive damages are a form of public remedy for undesirable
behavior, and should not be imposed by private arbitrators. On the other hand, behav-
ior sufficiently abhorrent to give rise to punitive damages in a public forum, should
not be insulated by a non-specific and irrevocable agreement to arbitrate future dis-
putes. Rather, the policy of nonwaiver expressed in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)
should be followed.
75. The obligation of good faith is implied in the making and performance of
contracts (see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 231 (1973)). Situations
involving bad faith may not rise to the level of fraud, or fraud may not be provable,
but where bad faith is suspected, courts should carefully scrutinize the facts and the
legal principles involved.
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